/. Introduction
Despite mounting wage arrears and the widely recognized and publicly articulated concern over the issue, 2 there has been little discussion of managerial objectives in allocating arrears among workers. 3 In this paper, we employ longitudinal data on the Russian population to analyze this question. We argue that rather than removing surplus workers from the payroll, managers effectively instituted wage cuts by resorting to partial wage nonpayment. A higher occurrence of wage withholding from relatively low wage workers in poorer regions (and industries) than in the wealthier regions (and industries) suggests that the pattern of wage nonpayment in Russia was influenced more by market incentives in managerial decision making than by traditional (paternalistic), pre-transition concerns over equity. Managerial behavior consistent with a response to market pressures for retaining more productive workers is also 'These figures are based on eight sectors (namely, industry, agriculture, construction, transportation, education, culture, health care, and science) for which Goskomstat reported wage arrears beginning in 1996, and which constitute approximately 78 percent of total official employment in 1995. They do not cover the large military sector in which wage arrears were quite substantial.
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Contrary to the impression given in much of the popular press, the government's failure to fully pay its employees is only a fraction of the wage nonpayments problem. In June 1997, wage arrears in the eight sectors of the economy noted in ftn.l amounted to 53.9 trillion rubles of which 11 trillion rubles (20.4 percent of the total) were due to nonpayment from local and federal budgets. Wage arrears to the military were estimated separately at 5.4 trillion rubles. 
//. Why Wage Arrears?
Workers were denied wages, and increasingly so beginning in 1994, primarily due to mounting cash flow problems faced by the government and enterprises 4 , and weak incentives for enterprise restructuring. The soft budget constraints of the Soviet period and the periodic unanticipated surges in output targets encouraged enterprises to hoard labor. Weak enforcement of bankruptcy laws during the subsequent transition to markets provided few incentives to managers for releasing workers from the payroll. They instead delayed wage payments and put workers on forced administrative leaves without pay rather than render them jobless.
At the same time, managers had economic incentives to retain rather than layoff redundant workers (see Aukutsionek and Kapeliushnikov, 1997) . For example, Russian enterprises were required to pay three months' severance pay to workers who lost their jobs due to workforce reduction. Faced with the severance pay requirement, managers found it less costly to retain workers at the enterprises with effectively reduced wages rather than fire them. Again, if aggregate demand eventually recovered and growth accelerated, the retained workers could provide a pool of trained labor allowing the enterprise to readily expand production.
Workers also faced substantial incentives to retain their jobs in the face of pay delays.
They were accustomed to receiving an array of benefits, including school, hospital, and day-care services as well as low-cost housing, all attached to the large enterprises. Most workers, therefore, could be expected to settle for receiving these entitlements with reduced pay in preference to losing their jobs and the associated benefits.
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FundamentaI problems associated with the system of taxation (see Hendley, et al., 1997) have led to widespread tax delinquency by enterprise managers (see Johnson, Kaufman, and Shleifer, 1997; Hendley, Ickes, and Ryterman, 1998), thereby weakening the federal treasury's ability to collect taxes. As a result, the government has been unable to pay its workers and its suppliers of energy and military items, which in turn has caused enterprises to withhold wages from their employees.
Managers and workers thus opted for informal arrangements involving implicit payoffs
for both sides rather than explicit contract renegotiations. The high economic (and political) costs of layoffs, combined with workers' readiness to accept temporary wage loss in return for the entitlements resulting from being officially on the payroll and the hesitation by regional and federal governments to rigorously implement bankruptcy laws, resulted in managerial reliance on downward wage adjustments accomplished through the partial withholding of wages and forced administrative leaves without pay.
The problem facing Russian employers can then be described as follows. Actual wage payments w per worker are specified as a fraction P of contracted wages w°:
(1) 
where, for simplicity, we assume a constant marginal productivity of labor a 6 . The number of workers is denoted by L; output price is normalized to 1; w™ is the expected wage opportunity outside the firm if the worker quits; and the quit rate q= q(w-w™), q'<0, q">0, is assumed to be a decreasing function of the wage differential (see Calvo, 1979; and Salop, 1979 Allowing wage noncompliance to negatively affect labor productivity by creating effort disincentives does not qualitatively change the results that follow (see footnote 9).
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Given the tax implications associated with cash profits, Russian managers may not choose to maximize profits, but may instead seek to maximize the rents that accrue to them. If we alternatively interpret (2) as a function describing managerial rents rather than enterprise profits, the comparative static result in (5) is unchanged. That is, rent-seeking managers will still respond to the market options of their -q'(pw c -w m )A.= l
which defines the enterprise's equilibrium position with respect to actual wage payments made, on average, to workers, and includes two endogenous variables (P and w*) and one exogenous variable (w™). The total differential of (3) gives:
-q"[pdw c + w c dp -dw m ]A. = 0
Assuming that contracted wages are inflexible 8 due, say, to prohibitive recontracting costs (so that dw°= 0), equation (4) yields the result: dp/dw™ = 1/w 0 > 0
which states that when a worker faces better expected offers outside the enterprise, the wage payments compliance rate is higher, i.e. wage withholding will be higher among workers with weaker alternative job prospects.
State sector decision makers and enterprise managers were therefore likely to devise strategies of wage nonpayment that best helped them lower wage outlays without losing their best workers. If managers were to withhold the wages of the better paid, more productive workers, they ran the risk of affecting their productivity through the nonpayment effort disincentive 9 , or their loss to another enterprise. Given the high labor turnover in Russian factories, employees with marketable skills and opportunities could be expected to move to a more productive workers by paying them a higher percentage of the wages owed to them in order to discourage costly (rent reducing) turnover.
8
This is a reasonable assumption: if wages were fully downwardly flexible, firms would not need to withhold wage payments, but instead simply lower wage rates in the face of surplus labor. 9 If we allow labor productivity a to be a concave function of the compliance rate p, i.e. a=cc(P), a'>0, a"<0, then it follows that dp/dw* = q'7[q"(w Table 1 .
"The wage variable used in Table 2 and the subsequent tables is an estimate of contracted wages which are actual wages paid plus an estimate of the monthly outstanding wage obligations by the employers, the latter calculated as the cumulated nonpayments divided by the number of months for which these wages have been owed. (Note that this procedure will be subject to measurement error because we do not know the debt which was incurred in the past 30 days.) Monthly wages are taken from the questionnaire item, "how much money in the last 30 days did you receive from your primary workplace after taxes? If you received all or part of the money in foreign currency, please convert all into rubles, and name the total sum." We deleted the responses when the individual reported either zero monthly wage or monthly wage in excess of 5,000,000 real rubles.
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Because specification (2) additionally includes productivity proxies such as education and employment tenure, the estimated wage variable effect reflects the productivity of unobserved labor quality, rents accruing to workers, and measurement error in the included proxies.
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An alternative explanation for these relationships might be that the more productive workers, having sorted into more profitable firms, were less affected by wage arrears. Data limitations unfortunately prevent us from testing this hypothesis. and the median wage in the region or industry, i.e. in lower paid sectors, the incidence of arrears would rise more strongly with individual wages than in richer sectors.
"Our ideal unit of analysis for this purpose should be the enterprise with data on the allocation of arrears to the individual employed by the enterprise; unfortunately, this information is not available to us. "Although the publicly disseminated RLMS data aggregates interview sites into eight broad regions, researchers at the RLMS project released disaggregated information to us for the purpose of this study. We were thus able to combine the 160 interview sites into 38 rather than eight regional groupings.
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Although the RLMS fielded questions on industry of employment, these responses were not translated from Russian and were therefore not distributed to the public for analysis. After discussions with RLMS project directors, we were able to obtain and translate the original industry responses (with the diligent assistance of Anna Demidova) and group them into 21 broad industry groups which correspond broadly to the categories used by Goskomstat in its reporting of industry level statistics. Table 3 We further assess the influence of labor market pressures on managerial decision making with respect to the allocation of wage arrears by relating alternative measures of the labor market options of workers to the likelihood of nonpayment (Pjowed), the amount withheld (Amtowed), and the duration of outstanding enterprise debt to the worker (Nopaym). Two subjective assessments of labor market power are used for the purpose: (I) the variable "findjb " gives the worker's assessment of the ease with which he/she would find comparable work if he/she were to be laid off; (ii) the variable "chary" indicates the worker's concern about being laid off. We also use an objective measure, the variable "complv" which indicates if the worker has ever been forced to go on unpaid leave. Parameter estimates for the regressors of interest are reported in Table 4 The variables findjb and chanj are coded to increase with lack of perceived market power so that positive coefficients indicate that when perceived market power was lower, the worker was more likely to incur nonpayment of wages. Similarly, complv=\ also indicates lack of market power, because complv=\ if the worker was forced on unpaid leave, so that we would expect to find a positive parameter estimate, i.e. managers will be less hesitant to withhold wages and risk losing employees with weaker market options.
The results of this analysis, reported in
"The regressions in columns 3 and 4 are for people who are owed wages, i.e. for people with Pjowed=\, so that the results are not simply picking up the pattern of occurrence of arrears found in the second column. t-1 and if the industry of employment in period t is different from that in period t-1 As already noted, we cannot empirically assess whether these changes occurred because workers quit their jobs in search of alternative employment, or because workers facing wage arrears were more likely to be fired, although, given managerial reluctance to fire workers, we suspect that much of this turnover was worker initiated.
In the last two regressions, we address the question of the effects of turnover on the subsequent wage arrears experience of workers. The estimated negative coefficient -0.258 of 
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The explanatory variables in both regressions are year t values. new job.) We conclude that job turnover was associated, on average, with a general reduction in the occurrence of wage withholding and perhaps in the amounts withheld, results consistent with our conjecture that much of this turnover was worker initiated.
IV. Conclusions
In this paper, we argue that the wage nonpayment decisions by Russian managers reflected managerial strategies aimed at lowering wage outlays while at the same time containing costly labor turnover. Our empirical analysis supports four main conclusions. First, the incidence of wage withholding was greater, its duration was longer, and its cumulative amount was proportionately higher among relatively low paid workers, suggesting that the implicit wage arrears tax was regressive. Second, the incidence of wage nonpayment was higher among lower wage workers in lower wage regions and industries, reflecting the influence of market pressures in managerial strategies in distributing wage arrears. Third, workers with weaker labor market prospects were more likely to experience wage withholding, in greater amounts, and for a longer period. Finally, we show that managerial concerns about the impact of wage withholding on worker-initiated turnover were well founded: Workers subjected to wage nonpayment tended to move to jobs with other enterprises and, in so doing, reduced the likelihood that they would face continued wage nonpayment. Table 2 (the full results are available on request). In regressions (1) and (2), the control variables take the values of period t-1; in regressions (3) and (4), they take the values of period t.
